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Vehicular communication networking is a promising approach for facilitating road safety, traffic 
management, and infotainment dissemination for drivers and passengers. However, it is subject to 
various malicious abuses and security attacks which hinder it from practical implementation.  
In this study, we propose a novel security protocol called GSIS based on group signature and 
identity-based signature schemes to meet the unique requirements of vehicular communication 
networks. The proposed protocol not only guarantees security and anonymity, but also provides easy 
traceability when the identity of the sender of a message has to be revealed by the authority. However, 
the cryptographic operations introduced in GSIS as well as the existing public key based message 
authentication protocols incur some computation and communication overhead which affect the 
system performance. Simulation results show that the GSIS security protocol is only applicable under 
light traffic conditions in terms of the message end to end delay and message loss ratio.  
Both the GSIS protocol and the existing public key based security protocols have to sign and verify 
all the received messages with asymmetric algorithms. The PKI based approach also has to attach a 
public key certificate in each packet. Therefore, to enhance the system performance and mitigate the 
message overhead without compromising the security requirement, this study further proposes an 
enhanced TESLA based Secure Vehicular Communication (TSVC) protocol. In TSVC, the 
communication overhead can be significantly reduced due to the MAC tag attached in each packet 
and only a fast hash operation is required to verify each packet. Simulation results show that TSVC 
maintains acceptable message latency, using a much smaller packet size, and significantly reduces the 
message loss ratio as compared to GSIS and existing PKI based protocols, especially when the traffic 
is denser. We conclude that the proposed approach could serve as good candidate for future vehicular 
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Chapter 1  Introduction 
With the advancement of wireless communication technologies in recent years, there has been 
increasing interest in road-side vehicular communications which aim at improving driving safety and 
traffic management. By being equipped with communication devices, vehicles can communicate with 
each other as well as with the Road Side Units (RSUs) located in critical points of the road, such as 
intersections or construction sites. This self-organized network formed by connecting the vehicles and 
RSUs is called a Vehicular Ad-Hoc Network (VANET).  
In a VANET, On Board Units (OBUs) (the communication devices in the vehicles) frequently 
broadcast routine traffic related messages with the information of position, current time, direction, 
speed, acceleration/deceleration, traffic events, etc. [DoT2006]. In addition, emergency messages are 
generated and sent by vehicles in case of emergency events such as sharp braking, traffic jams, or 
accidents. RSUs are also able to broadcast traffic related messages, such as ‘maximum curve turning 
speed’ or ‘road construction ahead’ notifications. Routine traffic related messages are one-hop 
broadcast without message relay, while emergency messages are transmitted through a multi-hop path, 
where the receiver of the messages continues broadcasting the message to the vehicles which follow. 
The VANET enables vehicles to communicate with each other. By frequently broadcasting and 
receiving traffic related messages, drivers are expected to get a better awareness of their driving 
environment. Early action can be taken to respond to an abnormal situation to avoid any possible 
damage or to follow a better route by circumventing a traffic bottleneck. For example, if drivers can 
receive an ‘emergency braking’ message from the vehicles several cars ahead, or a message such as 
‘change lane notification’ from the cars in the neighboring lanes, they can take early action to slow 
down to avoid collisions. In addition, with a VANET connected with the backbone Internet, 
passengers sitting in the cars can go online to enjoy various entertainment-related Internet services 
with their laptops.  
Tremendous attention from both industry and academia has been absorbed to this newly generated 
and promising network scenario. Doubtlessly, the creation of the VANET is a great advantage to 
traffic management, road-side safety related applications, and passengers’ entertainment experience. 
Nevertheless, any malicious behavior of users, such as modification and replay attacks with respect to 
the disseminated traffic related messages, could be fatal to the other users. Furthermore, user related 
privacy information such as driver’s name, license plate, speed, position, model and traveling route 
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has to be well-protected, which means the users should be kept anonymous when their vehicles are 
providing traffic related information. On the other hand, in the case of a dispute such as a crime/car 
accident scene investigation, the authorities should be able to trace and reveal the identities of the 
message senders to help expose the reason of the accident or look for witnesses (this co-existing 
anonymity and identity traceability is called conditional anonymity [RH2005]). Therefore, a suite of 
carefully designed security mechanisms, which are critical to its overall success, should be developed 
for achieving security and preserving conditional anonymity in VANETs,  
This study mainly tackles the problems of security assurance and conditional anonymity in 
VANETs. We introduce a novel security and anonymity preserving protocol named GSIS, by 
integrating the techniques of group signature and identity-based signature algorithms. Unlike the 
previous studies, we divide the security problems into two categories: the communications between 
OBUs and OBUs, as well as between OBUs and RSUs, due to their different security requirements. 
In the first category, group signatures are used to secure the communication between OBUs and 
OBUs, where messages can be securely and anonymously signed by the senders, and meanwhile, the 
identities of the senders can be recovered by the authorities. On the other hand, identity-based 
cryptography is used to authenticate the messages sent by RSUs, within which the signature overhead 
can be reduced. Further, the efforts of deploying a public key infrastructure system can be totally 
avoided because the identity of a user is simply taken as its public key in identity-based cryptography. 
However, experiment and simulation results show that the GSIS protocol itself incurs a high message 
loss ratio especially when the traffic becomes denser.  
The study then proposes an enhanced security scheme named TSVC (TESLA-based Secure 
Vehicular Communications) to improve the performance and the operating efficiency of the original 
GSIS and PKI based security protocols further without affecting the fundamental security and 
conditional anonymity requirements in VANETs. The proposed TSVC scheme can be applied to both 
the reported PKI based security schemes and the GSIS security protocol. Informed by the TESLA 
mechanism (Timed Efficient Stream Loss-tolerant Authentication) [PCTS2002], the new TSVC 
protocol only needs to do symmetric MAC operations at the receiver side, which is sufficient to 
authenticate the source of the message, instead of performing any asymmetric verification. Also since 
only a short MAC tag is attached at each message, the extra message length and the bandwidth 
overhead due to the security mechanism can be reduced significantly. Moreover, TSVC is much 
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different from any of the other security schemes in the resultant message loss ratio, which is found to 
be almost independent of the traffic density.  
Extensive simulations were conducted which demonstrated that the new TSVC protocols 
significantly reduce the message loss ratio and maintain acceptable message latency, as compared to 
existing PKI based security protocols as well as the GSIS protocol. The performance enhancement is 
more obvious when traffic becomes denser.  
Considering the future convergence of Internet and vehicular networks, this study also briefly 
introduces a practical three-layer network architecture based on the standard of IEEE 802.16e mesh 
mode [IEEE802.16e-2005] for providing Internet access to vehicles for broader and more versatile 
application scenarios.  
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows: Related works and some preliminary and background 
knowledge as well as the network architecture are given in the later part of this chapter. In Chapter 2, 
the detailed GSIS protocol is presented including the simulation result. In Chapter 3, the enhanced 
version of the security protocol called TSVC is described followed by performance evaluations from 
the simulation result. Finally, the study is concluded in Chapter 4. 
1.1 Related Work 
Currently, the IEEE 802.11p task group is working on the DSRC (Dedicated Short Range 
Communications) [DoT_DSRC] standard which enhances the 802.11 protocols to support wireless 
data communications between vehicles and the road-side infrastructure [USDoT2006]. Extensive 
studies have been reported for inter-vehicle communications (IVC). However, most of them have 
focused on either a specific application scenario, feasibility, MAC layer performance analysis, or 
various routing solutions [TC2003, LH2004, NAG2004, K2005, YASM2005]. Some efforts have 
been made to improve security and anonymity [RH2005, PNM2006, ABD2006, DoT2006, RH2007, 
RPH2006, PKHK2006, IEEE1609.2-2006, SURH2007, FRF2007, GBW2007, PP2005].  
The studies in [PNM2006, ABD2006] discussed general security issues such as attack models, 
security requirements and properties of IVC systems instead of providing a solution to ensure these 
requirements. Most of the current research [RH2005, RH2007, RPH2006, SURH2007] dealing with 
security and anonymity issues for VANETs propose to use Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) based 
security schemes. Vehicles are installed with a large number of anonymous certificates (43,800 
certificates [RH2007]) and randomly select one of them at a time to sign each message in order to 
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meet the driver’s privacy requirement. Also, a unique electronic identity is used to verify the 
identities of vehicle owners by the police in case of disputes.  
The Vehicle Safety Communications (VSC) project group, part of the Department of 
Transportation in the United States, evaluated the feasibility of using the DSRC standard to support 
safety related applications [USDoT2006]. In [DoT2006], the VSC group also proposes to use a list of 
short-lived anonymous certificates to preserve the privacy of drivers; the certificates are discarded 
after being used. The scheme provides a higher security level than [RH2007] because the certificates 
are blindly signed by the Certificate Authority (CA) in order to deal with the ‘insider’ attack. A 
linkage marker is used for the escrow authorities to connect the blindly-signed anonymous certificates 
with a single vehicle.  
The trial-use IEEE standard [IEEE1609.2-2006] for secure vehicle communications was released in 
July 2006. It provides detailed documentation including the format of the security messages and the 
choice of the cryptosystem. [IEEE1609.2-2006] adopts the VSC group’s principal idea which uses 
anonymous public keys to sign and verify messages and use short-lived anonymous certificates to 
automatically revoke keys. 
One disadvantage of the above schemes is the communication cost incurred by the certificates 
which have to be added to each message. (Each anonymous certificate has a short life time such as 
several minutes. Even if the certificate does not have to be added to each message since it could be 
cached by the receiver for later public key authentication sending from the same source, considering 
the dynamic changing neighbors of each message sender, whenever a new vehicle joins the group, the 
certificate has to be added to the message.)  
In addition, all compromised or expired vehicles have to be revoked, as do all of the certificates 
owned by those revoked vehicles. The revocation is done by distributing CRLs (Certificate 
Revocation Lists). The CRL size is huge and is not efficient to transfer over the Internet. To 
overcome this high storage cost of the CRL, Raya, et al. in [RJPAH2006] proposed to use a tamper-
proof device to assist the membership revocation. If a node has to be revoked, the CA sends a 
revocation message to the node. Once the node receives the revocation message, its tamper-proof 
device automatically erases all the anonymous public keys and stops signing messages. Therefore, the 
huge CRL does not have to be distributed over the Internet. [RJPAH2006] also presents a distributed 
revocation protocol to locally and temporally revoke the attacker once it is detected to have sent fake 
messages.   
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Another drawback of the above schemes is that they violate the location privacy requirement and 
are subject to a movement tracking attack. The movement path of any vehicle can easily be traced by 
malicious global message observers, even if the public keys do not contain the real ID information 
and are updated frequently. This is because each public key has a life time of several minutes 
[RH2007] and different vehicles update their public keys at different times. Therefore, the public key 
which changes at a particular time t is sure to be from the same source who uses a different public key 
before the moment t, because public keys used by other vehicles remain the same before and after t. 
In this way, messages sent by the same vehicle can be connected and thus the whole movement of a 
vehicle can be traced. To cope with this location privacy issue, Freudiger et al. in [FRF2007] 
employed the concept of a Mix-Zone. All vehicles within the mix zone will share a secret key 
initiated by the RSU. All traffic messages are encrypted by this shared secret key. Public keys are 
changed when vehicles go out of the mix zone. The location information is therefore protected and 
cannot be observed by external adversaries. 
[SURH2007] proposed a protocol to secure the report of emergency events such as a crash. It 
presents a new security architecture from which vehicles can update their anonymous cryptographic 
credentials while they are on the go with the assistance of the Roadside Access Point (RAP). Their 
scheme also supports a decentralized architecture when providing conditionally anonymous inter-
vehicle communications.  
   Unlike those asymmetric public key based security schemes, [CJW2005] and [XSSSZ2007] have 
proposed using symmetric key based ideas to secure the communications between vehicles and the 
roadside infrastructures used to gain Internet access. However, the former scheme which uses short-
lived pseudonyms to do authentication severely violates the privacy of the user’s route. Even though 
the identities are hidden, the whole traveling route can be tracked by a sequence of the collaborated 
roadside infrastructures. Also, to check the validity of the handles of the vehicles, the roadside 
infrastructure has to contact the ombudsman every time a vehicle is associating with it, which creates 
a huge communication latency. The latter scheme uses a randomly selected key set drawn from a 
local key pool to do message authentication. The identity privacy and traceability highly depend on 
the property that there is a high probability that two vehicles might share one of the keys used to do 
the authentication, but there is a low probability that two vehicles share all of the keys used to do 
authentication. Therefore it relies highly on the size of the each key pool. Also, there are heavy 
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storage costs for each roadside infrastructure. These disadvantages make them not applicable for real 
world deployment.  
This study first proposes a novel security protocol from a different point of view. It is based on 
group signature and identity based signature schemes which not only meets the security and 
conditional anonymity requirements for the VANET, but also simplifies the certificate management, 
reduces the size of the CRL and the storage cost of the anonymous certificate list on the authority’s 
server side. Moreover, it avoids the efforts of deploying a public key infrastructure system for the 
road-side units.  Applying group signature schemes to VANETs was first mentioned in [PP2005] in a 
paragraph. No details were given in this paper. In addition, Guo et al. in [GBW2007] also proposed to 
use group signature schemes to preserve the security and privacy for VANETs. This work was 
published during the time when this thesis was being written.  
1.2 Preliminaries and Background Knowledge 
1.2.1 Attack Model 
There are several possible attacks on VANETs:  
1. Message integrity attack: The adversary may modify the contents of the messages sent by 
others to meet specific purposes.   
2. Fake Messages: The adversary may send messages whose contents do not correspond to 
the real world traffic situation. For example, one may send a fake traffic jam message to 
the others on the road so that it can manipulate to get a better traffic condition.  
3. Message replay attack: The adversary replays the messages sent some time before in order 
to disturb the traffic. 
4. Impersonation attack: The adversary may pretend to be another vehicle or even an RSU to 
send false messages to fool others.  
5. Denial of service (DoS) attack: The adversary sends irrelevant messages to take up the 
channel and consume the computational resources of other nodes.  
6. Movement tracking: In this case, the adversary intercepts a significant amount of messages 
in a certain region, and traces a vehicle in terms of its physical position and moving 
patterns simply through information analysis. 
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Since DoS attacks in wireless communication networks have been extensively investigated in the 
past, [LY2006, M2005], in this study we will focus on non-DoS related security and privacy issues. 
1.2.2 Security Requirements 
In order to mitigate the potential threats in the above attack models, a well-developed security 
mechanism should meet the following requirements:  
1. Message Integrity and Source Authentication: All messages should be delivered unaltered 
and the origin of the messages should be authenticated to guard against impersonation 
attack. 
2. Message Authenticity: Messages should reflect the real situation instead of being forged 
maliciously.  
3. Anonymous Vehicle Authentication: The identities of vehicles should be hidden to normal 
message receivers during the authentication process to protect the senders’ private 
information, such as position, plate number, and movement route.  
4. Avoid Movement Tracking: The movement paths of vehicles should not be tracked by 
message observers.  
5. RSU ID Exposure: Roadside infrastructures have no anonymity issue. Instead, they should 
evidently present their identities, including the geographical location, what kind of 
equipment it is, what type of services it is authorized to provide, etc. 
6. Vehicle ID Traceability: The law authority should be able to determine the real identities of 
the message senders in the event of a dispute.  
7. Efficiency: The security protocol should be efficient with small communication overhead 
and acceptable processing latency. 
8. Robustness: The network should be able to function well even under a denial of service 
attack. 
As will be shown later, the protocols in this study satisfy the security requirements 1, 3, 5, 6, and 7. 
1.2.3 Bilinear Pairing 
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The concept of group signatures was first proposed by Chaum and van Heyst [CvH1991] in 
Eurocrypt 1991. The main feature of a group signature scheme is that it provides anonymity of the 
signers. The verifiers can only judge that the signer belongs to a particular group without knowing 
who the signer is in the group. However, in exceptional situations, the group manager is able to reveal 
the unique identity of the signature’s originator.  
We first review the concept of bilinear pairing which is the fundamental technique of the proposed 
protocol. Bilinear pairing has had tremendous interest and attention from the security community 
since the technique has been identified to be able to solve some problems that were previously 
thought unsolvable, such as an id-based signature scheme [BF2001]. Another advantage is that 
pairing-based schemes can save communication bandwidth compared to traditional schemes such as 
RSA and ElGamal due to a smaller signature overhead.    
Definition 1, Admissible bilinear map [BF2001]: Let 1( , )G × , 2( , )G × and ( , )TG × be three groups of 
the same prime order p , and 1 2,P P be generators of 1G and 2G ,respectively. An admissible bilinear 
map is a map ê : 1 2 TG G G× → satisfying the following properties: 
Bilinearity: 1 2( , )U V G G∀ ∈ × and , pa b Z∀ ∈ , ( , ) ( , )a b abe U V e U V=
) ) ; 
Non-degeneracy: 1 2ˆ( , ) 1 TGe P P ≠ ; 
Computability: there exists an efficient algorithm to compute ˆ( , )e U V , for all 1 2( , )U V G G∈ × . 
Definition 2, Bilinear parameter generator [BF2001]: A bilinear parameter generator gen is a 
probabilistic algorithm that takes a security parameter 1k  as input and outputs a 7-
tuple 1 1 2 2 ˆ( , , , , , , )Tp P G P G G e in polynomial time satisfying the following conditions: p is a prime with 
12 2k kp +< < , the groups 1G , 2G and TG are all of order p , 1 2,P P  generate 1G and 2G , respectively, and 
ê : 1 2 TG G G× → is an admissible bilinear map.  
Next we present the underlying assumptions which are the basis of the proposed security protocol:  
Let 1G , 2G  be cyclic groups of prime order p , where possibly 1 2G G= . 
1. q −Strong Diffie-Hellman problem (q-SDH) [BBS2004]. 
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Let 1 2,g g  be generators of 1G and 2G . The q-SDH problem in ( 1 2,G G ) is defined as follows: given 
a ( 2q + ) tuple 
2
( )
1 2 2( , , ,..., )
q
g g g gγ γ as input, output a pair 
1
1/( )( , )xg xγ +  where *px∈Ζ . An algorithm A is 
said to have advantage ξ  if 
    
2 1
( ) 1/( )
1 2 2Pr[( , , ,..., ) ( , )]
q A xg g g g g xγ γ γ ξ+→ ≥ , where *px∈Ζ  and γ is a random element of *pΖ . 
The ( , , )q t SDHξ − assumption holds in ( 1G , 2G ) if no t -time algorithm has advantage at least ξ in 
solving the q-SDH problem in ( 1G , 2G ). 
2. Decision Linear problem in 1G [BBS2004]. 
Let 1, , ,g u v h be generators of 1G . The decision linear problem is that given 1, , , , ,a b cu v h u v h G∈ as 
input, to output yes if a b c+ =  and no otherwise. 
The advantage of an algorithm A is defined as   
1
1
| Pr[ ( , , , , , ) : , , , , ]
Pr[ ( , , , , , ) : , , , , , ] |
def R R





AdvLinear A u v h u v h yes u v h G a b Z
A u v h u v yes u v h G a b Zη η
+= = ← ←
− = ← ←
 
An algorithm A  ( , )t ξ -decides Decision Linear in 1G if A runs in time at most t , and AAdvLinear is at 
least ξ . 
The ( , )t ξ -Decision Linear Assumption (LA) holds in 1G  if no t -time algorithm has advantage at 
least ξ in solving the Decision Linear problem in 1G . 
3. q −Bilinear Diffie Hellman Inversion problem (q-BDHI) [BLMQ2005] 
Let ( 1 2, , TG G G ) be bilinear map groups of order p , with generators 1g ∈  1G and 2g ∈ 2G . The q-
BDHI problem in ( 1 2, , TG G G ) consists in, given
2( ) ( )
1 2 2 2 2( , , , ,..., )
qx x xg g g g g , computing 1/1 2( , ) x Te g g G∈
) , 
where x is a random element of *pΖ .  
An algorithm A is said to have advantage ξ  if 
    
2 1
( ) 1/
1 2 2 2Pr[( , , ,..., ) ( , ) ]
q Ax x xg g g g e g g ξ→ ≥) , where x is a random element of *pΖ . 
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The ( , , )q t BDHIξ − assumption holds in ( 1G , 2G ) if no t -time algorithm has advantage at least ξ in 
solving the q-BDHI problem in ( 1G , 2G ). 
1.3 Network Architecture  
An inter-vehicular communication network is used to exchange traffic-related messages to enhance 
road safety and help manage traffic. In order to provide infotainment for passengers, vehicles are 
expected to have Internet access. In addition, some safety-related applications also depend on Internet 
access such as certificate, CRL, or other keying material updating, broad-view traffic monitoring in 
the central office, automatic emergency reporting, or the retrieval of a stolen car.   
In this section, we introduce a three-layer network architecture based on WiMax [IEEE802.16e-
2005] as shown in Figure 1-1, in which broadband wireless Internet access is supported for both 
vehicles’ safety related applications and general mobile users’ entertainment related applications.  
The top layer is composed of WiMax base stations, which are interconnected either through peer-
to-peer wireless communication or through wired Internet connections.  
 
Figure 1-1.  Proposed roadside vehicle network architecture 
The second layer is composed of roadside WiMax mesh routers, which form a wireless multi-hop 
mesh network (mesh mode in WiMax) aiming to extend the wireless coverage and increase the 
network robustness and throughput. Some of these nodes are connected with the Internet either with 
wired backhaul or wireless connections with WiMax base stations.  
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The third layer includes vehicles, user devices and roadside units (RSU), which form an ad hoc 
network based on the IEEE 802.11p protocol. Note that an RSU and a mesh router can be integrated 
into a single physical device. The communication between mesh routers and between mesh routers 
and WiMax base stations adopts 802.16 protocols. For the passengers sitting inside of the vehicles, 
they can either connect with the Wi-Fi access point installed on top of their vehicle with 802.11g or 
they can communicate with the road-side mesh routers directly if the users’ devices support 802.16 
standards.   
By communicating with the roadside mesh routers, vehicles and passengers can gain access to the 
Internet for a short moment when passing through any of the roadside mesh routers. Thus, the second 
layer mesh routers should be able to perform fast handoff in order to support basic Internet services 
such as e-mail and TCP applications. Note that the handoff process is expected to be predictive when 
the moving pattern and speed of the vehicle are given. In addition, the roadside mesh routers should 
work as gateways which also support the 802.11p protocol which transform the safety messages 
broadcasted by the vehicles into IP packets. With the second layer, the workload of the vehicles is 
reduced. Otherwise, the vehicles need to send multiple copies of safety messages in different formats: 
one to the other vehicles with 802.11p, and one to the base stations with 802.16e.  
There are many security issues in this network architecture, such as the fast and private handoff 
process of mesh routers, the secure routing problems in the VANET and the mutual authentication 
between the mesh routers and the base stations; however, in this paper, we mainly discuss the secure 
communication issues in the third layer of this network architecture, communication between vehicles 









GSIS: A Secure and Anonymous Vehicular Communication 
Protocol 
2.1 Overview of the GSIS Protocol 
2.1.1 System Formulation  
First, we assume there is no energy limit for vehicles and the vehicle’s communication device is 
actively powered for any computation and communication task. Furthermore, the vehicles are 
equipped with reliable positioning system like GPS and they can get reliable and accurate time 
information, for example through a central satellite. Finally, we assume the highest security scenario 
in which adversaries are able to intercept, modify, retransmit and delete any message they desire in a 
VANET. 
In our protocol, routine messages from the opposite direction of the road are ignored, while 
emergency messages from the opposite side will be processed.  
In IVC applications, it is not necessary to achieve message confidentiality since everybody has the 
right to know the content of the traffic related messages. Thus, we choose to use digital signatures to 
sign every message sent by OBUs and RSUs. In this case, any receiver can verify the received 
messages and make certain of the integrity and authenticity of the messages with the non-repudiation 
property.  
We divide our security design into two categories: communications between OBUs as well as 
between RSUs and OBUs, and consider the security solutions separately due to their respective 
requirements. The two categories are discussed in the following two subsections.  
2.1.2 Communications between OBUs 
The main challenge of the communications between OBUs lies in the contradiction between the 
design requirements of vehicle anonymity and identity traceability. Traditional public key encryption 
schemes are not suitable for signing the safety messages because identity information is included in 
the public key certificates. One solution is to use a list of anonymous certificates which do not contain 
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the identification information [RH2005]. All these anonymous certificates and the relationship with 
their owners are kept in the central Transportation Regulation Center (TRC) who could trace the real 
ID of the sender in their huge database. This approach can achieve conditional anonymity in a 
straightforward manner but at the expense of the high storage cost for a global certificate list for the 
authorities.  
Therefore, we propose a security protocol by using a group signature scheme [CvH1991] to sign 
the messages sent by vehicles. As we mentioned, the main feature of a group signature scheme is that 
it provides for anonymity of the signers. The verifiers can judge whether the signer belongs to a group 
without knowing who the signer is in the group. However, in exceptional situations, the group 
manager is able to reveal the unique identity of the signature’s originator. Therefore, the group 
signature technique provides a better way to meet the anonymity and traceability requirements. The 
group signature technique also reduces the workload of the public key verification and certificate path 
verification operations. In addition, the group signature scheme can satisfy other basic security 
requirements such as message integrity and source authentication. 
A secure group signature has the following desirable properties [ACJT2000, W2004]: 
1. Correctness: Signatures produced by a group member must be accepted by the verifier. 
2. Unforgeability: Only a member in the group can sign messages on behalf of the group. 
3. Anonymity: Given a valid signature, identifying the actual signer is computationally hard 
for normal members other than the group manager. 
4. Unlinkability: Deciding whether two different valid signatures were computed by the same 
group member is computationally hard. 
5. No Framing: Even if a subset of group members and group managers collude, they cannot 
sign on behalf of non-involved group members. 
6. Traceability: The group manager is able to open a valid signature and identify the actual 
signer. 
In addition to the basic properties mentioned above, some other features are also preferred in IVC 
application, which are listed as follows. 
1. Role Separation: In the real world, it is preferred if the role of the group manager can be 
divided into a membership manager and a tracing manager. The membership manager 
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could be the TRC in charge of assigning private keys and group public keys to the vehicles, 
whereas the tracing mangers are law authorities in charge of revealing the real IDs of the 
message senders.  
2. Group Membership Revocation: It is indispensable in the IVC system to have the ability to 
selectively revoke the group memberships of the compromised vehicles either through 
updating keys or releasing Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs).  
3. High Efficiency: The computational cost and the length of the signatures should be small in 
order to meet the stringent communication requirement in the IVC system. 
Dozens of group signature schemes have been proposed since 1991. However, the security of some 
proposed group signature schemes are susceptible to attack. For instance, many ID-based group 
signature schemes, like those in [W2004, P2002, H2004], cannot meet the unlinkability requirement. 
In addition, some schemes, like those in [ZWW2003, W2004], are proven to be forgeable and 
traceable. Also, most of the reported group signature schemes either have too long a signature 
overhead or are not-revocable, or the roles of the group manager are indivisible. Thus, after thorough 
evaluation, we choose the Short Group Signature scheme that is proposed by Boneh et al. [BBS2004] 
which is considered to suit IVC applications best.   
2.1.3 Communications between RSU and OBU 
The main difference with respect to the security requirements between RSUs and OBUs is that RSUs 
do not need anonymity. Therefore, we propose to use the identity string of each RSU as the public 
key to sign the messages. With the ID-based signature scheme, the workload caused by the certificate 
management process can be significantly reduced, and the public key updating and revocation 
operation can be largely simplified. Among all the known ID-based signature schemes, the provably-
secure ID-based signature scheme given by Barreto et al [BLMQ2005] is adopted in this study since 
the length of the signature is reduced due to bilinear pairing. Barreto’s scheme is also among the most 
efficient ones regarding the verification algorithm which needs only 1 pairing computation.  
2.1.4 System Notations 
For ease of presentation, the notations used to describe the security protocol throughout the paper are 
listed as follows: 
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Table 2-1. Notations 
Notations Descriptions 
TRC Transportation Regulation Center 
OBU On Board Unit 
RSU Road Side Unit 
IVC inter-vehicular Communications 
MM Membership Manager 
TM Tracing Manager 
gpk  Group Public Key 
[ ]gsk i  Vehicle 'i s private key 
tgmsk  TM’s private key 
mgmsk  MM’s private key 
R
Zγ ←  Randomly select a number γ from set Z  
2.2 Proposed Security Protocol between OBUs 
2.2.1 Message Format 
The packet format of the safety messages sent by OBU is defined as follows: 
Table 2-2. Packet format for OBU messages 
Group ID Payload Signature
4 bytes 100 bytes 184 bytes
 
Vehicles will be divided into several groups as will be discussed in section 2.4. Group ID is thus 
used to identify which group the vehicle belongs to. The message payload part should include 
position, current time, direction, speed, acceleration/deceleration, traffic events, etc., as well as the 
timestamp of when the message is generated. According to [DoT2006], the payload of a message is 
around 100 bytes. The timestamp is used to ensure that the message is freshly generated instead of a 
duplicate of a previous one. The timestamp is 8 bytes long, supporting resolution to milliseconds. If 
the vehicles are synchronized to within one millisecond, by a central satellite for example, then 
messages should be ignored if they arrive α time late, where α is the maximum message 
transmission time between vehicles. The last field is the signature of the OBU on the first two parts. 
The length of the signature will be discussed in the following paragraphs. 
2.2.2 Security Protocol for OBU and OBU Communication 
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The security protocol is an elaboration of the short group signature scheme [BBS2004]. We divide the 
role of the group manager into MM and TM to better suit the real-world management architecture. 
MMs can be conceived as real-world Traffic Regulation Centers who are only responsible for 
assigning keying materials to vehicles during vehicle registration time. TMs are law authorities who 
are only responsible for revealing the identities of message senders. The protocol contains the 
following six phases. We will show how to incorporate the group signature scheme to the vehicular 
communications field.  
2.2.2.1 System setup 
The law authority who acts as TM first generates two multiplicative cyclic groups 1G and 2G with 
generators 1g and 2g respectively of the same prime order p . Let ϕ  be a computable isomorphism 
from 2G to 1G , with 2 1( )g gϕ = ; and ê be a computable bilinear map, ê : 1 2 TG G G× → with the following 
properties: 
Bilinearity: 1 2( , )u v G G∀ ∈ × and , qa b Z∀ ∈ , ( , ) ( , )a b abe u v e u v=
) ) ; 
Non-degeneracy: 1 2ˆ( , ) 1 TGe g g g= ≠ ; 
For security and efficiency’s consideration, we recommend choosing the MNT curve [SB2006] 
with embedding degree k=6 and 163-bit  prime order p .   




Gh G← , 20 2 \{1 }
R
Gh G← and *1 2,
R
pZξ ξ ← . It then sets 1,u v G∈  s.t. 1 2u v hξ ξ= =  and 
sets 1 2 2,h h G∈ such that 11 0h hξ= , 22 0h h
ξ= . Finally, TM keeps its private key as 1 2( , )tgmsk ξ ξ= and sends 
the system parameters  
( 0 1 2 1 2 1 2 ˆ, , , , , , , , , , , , , ,Tu v h h h h G G G g g g p eϕ ) 
to the TRC which works as the MM.  
In the original short group signature scheme, TM randomly selects *
R
pZγ ← and sets 2pubw P g γ= =  as 
a system parameter. Here, in our protocol, it is the MM who randomly chooses *
R
pZγ ← and sets 
2pubw P g
γ= = , but not the TM. The private key for MM is ( )mgmsk γ= . MM also chooses a secure 
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cryptographic hash function * 5 2 *1 1:{0,1} T pH G G G Z× × × → . Finally, MM publishes the system 
parameters param and the group public key gpk  as follows: 
0 1 2 1 2 1 2 ˆ( , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , )Tparam u v h h h h G G G g g g p e Hϕ=  
1 2( , , , )gpk g g g w=  
We separate the gpk  from param because every time a node is revoked, gpk is updated while param  
remains the same. The revocation scheme can be found in section 2.2.2.6.  
    So far the system has been set up.  
2.2.2.2 Membership registration 
During the vehicle registration process, the MM generates a tuple ( , )i iA x for each vehicle i as its 
private key [ ]gsk i  using MM’s secret key γ . This is done by the following procedure: MM first 
computes *
R





γ +← . In the end, MM stores the information ( , ,i i iA x ID ) into 
its record, which completes the membership registration. The ( , ,i i iA x ID ) database is shared with TM. 
Note that only MM has the secret key γ , therefore, only MM but not TM, can assign private keys to 
vehicles. ( , ,i i iA x ID ) can come with the signature signed by MM with any public key based scheme in 
order to prevent TM from choosing its own γ and registering vehicles by itself illegally. With the 
signature signed by TM, vehicles can prove that their private keys are indeed from the MM later 
when necessary.  
2.2.2.3 Signing 
Given a safety message M , the vehicle signs the message before sending it out. With the group public 
key gpk , and the private key pair ( , )i iA x , the signing procedure is composed of the following steps:  
Select the exponents *,
R
pZα β ← . 
Compute an encryption of iA , and 1 2 3( , , )T T T , where 1T u
α← , 2T vβ← , ( )3 iT A h α β+← . 
Compute 1 ixδ α← and 2 ixδ β← . 
Randomly pick up blinding values 
1
, , , ,
ix





Compute 1 2 3 4 5, , , ,R R R R R  as below: 
1
rR u α←  
2
rR v β←  
1 2
3 3 2 2( , ) ( , ) ( , )
xir r rr rR e T g e h w e h g δ δα β − −− −← ⋅ ⋅) ) )  
1
4 1
xir rR T u δ−← ⋅  
2
5 2
xir rR T v δ−← ⋅ . 
Obtain the challenge c using the above values and the M, 
*
1 2 3 1 2 3 4 5( , , , , , , , , ) pc H M T T T R R R R R Z← ∈ . 
Compute
1 2
, , , ,xis s s s sα β δ δ , where:  
s r cα α α= + , 
s r cβ β β= + , 
i ix x i
s r cx= + , 
11 1
s r cδ δ δ= + , 
22 2
s r cδ δ δ= +  
Finally, combine the above values to form the message signature σ   
1 21 2 3
( , , , , , , , , )
ix
T T T c s s s s sα β δ δσ ←  
Format the message according to Table 2-2 and send it out. 
2.2.2.4 Verification 
Once receiving a message, the receiver first checks if the time information in the message payload is 
within the allowable time window. If not, the message is ignored; otherwise the receiving vehicles 
will perform signature verification by first reconstructing ( 1 2 3 4 5, , , ,R R R R R% % % % % ) and then re-computing the 




s cR u Tα←% , 
2 2/
s cR u Tβ←% , 
1 2
3 3 2 2 3 1 2( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( ( , ) / ( , ))
xi
s ss s s cR e T g e h w e h g e T w e g gδ δα β
− − − −
⋅ ⋅← ⋅) ) ) ) )%  
1
4 1 /
xis sR T u δ←% , 
2
5 2 /i
s sxR T v δ←%  
Then, c~ is re-computed from 
1 2 3 1 2 3 4 5( , , , , , , , , ).c H M T T T R R R R R= % % % % %%  
The receiver finally checks to see if this value is the same as the c in the signatureσ . If so, the 
receiver considers the message to be valid and unaltered from a trusted group member. If not, the 
receiver neglects the message. 
2.2.2.5 Membership tracing 
A membership tracing operation is performed when solving a dispute, where the real identity of the 
signature generator is desired. The TM first checks the validity of the signature, and then computes 
iA as:  
1 2
3 1 2/( )iA T T Tξ ξ← ⋅ . 
Once the authority has revealed the element iA from the TM, it can look up the record 
( , , )i i iA x ID which is shared with MM to find the corresponding identity iID .  Note that only TM has 
the secret information of 1 2( , )tgmsk ξ ξ= , therefore, only TM but not MM, can reveal vehicles’ private 
keys and their real world identities.  
2.2.2.6 Membership revocation 
Once a vehicle is found to be compromised and its private keys and identities are identified by the 
law authority, this vehicle should be excluded from the system. Currently there are two approaches of 
revoking the compromised nodes. One is through group public key and private key updating to all un-
revoked vehicles. Given the released private key pairs of the revoked vehicles in a Revocation List 
(RL), un-revoked nodes can locally update their private key pair [ ]gsk i and the group public key gpk , 
whereas those revoked nodes cannot update their keying materials [BBS2004]. This scheme may 
introduce significant overhead since each vehicle has to change the public and private keys from time 
to time when there is a member get revoked. The other revoking mechanism is similar to the 
traditional CRL-based revocation scheme, called Verifier-Local Revocation (VLR) [BS2004], by 
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which only verifiers are involved in the revocation check up operation. The VLR scheme is efficient 
when the number of the revoked vehicles is small. However, since the signature verification time 
grows linearly with the number of revoked vehicles, the vehicle revocation verification procedure 
becomes particularly time-consuming and inefficient when a large number of revoked vehicles exist 
in the revocation list. 
Based on the above concerns, we propose a hybrid membership revocation mechanism in order to 
achieve a graceful tradeoff which is a combination of the VLR scheme [BS2004] and the keying 
material updating scheme [BBS2004].  
The basic idea of the proposed mechanism is that when the number of revoked vehicles in the RL is 
less than a pre-defined threshold value Tr , the VLR mechanism is adopted; otherwise, the first 
approach through updating the corresponding public keys and private key pairs is employed. In real 
world deployment, the threshold valueTr can be decided by a combination of several factors such as 
how often a node is revoked in real situations and how efficient the revocation verification algorithm 
is implemented by the hardware. The proposed revocation mechanism is further described as follows:  
Case 1:  
When | |RL Tr< , the MM publishes the Revocation List 1 2{ , ,... }bRL A A A= ,where b Tr< . For a given 
group signatureσ , the receiver first executes the signature verification operation, and then executes 
the revocation check, which is shown in Table 2-3. 
Table 2-3. Revocation Verification  Algorithm 
Revocation Verification  Algorithm: 
Input: ( , ,param RL σ ) 
Output: valid  or invalid  
for 1i ←  to | |RL  do 
       get one iA from RL  do 
           if 3 0 1 1 2 2( / , ) ( , ) ( , )ie T A h e T h e T h= ⋅
) ) ) , then 
                   return invalid  
           end 
end 




0 1 2 1 2 1 2 ˆ( , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , )Tparam u v h h h h G G G g g g p e Hϕ= . If the returned value is valid , the signer of the 
groupσ has not been revoked. However, if the returned value is invalid , then there exists some 
iA being encoded in 1 2 3, ,T T T , which can be checked by 3 0 1 1 2 2( / , ) ( , ) ( , )ie T A h e T h e T h=
) ) )  since  
3 0    ( / , )ie T A h
)  
0 ( / , )i ie A h A h
α β+= )  
0 0 0 ( , ) ( , ) ( , )e h h e h h e h h
α β α β+= =) ) )  
1 2
0 0 ( , ) ( , )e u h e v h
αξ βξ= ) )  
1 2
0 0 ( , ) ( , )e u h e v h
ξ ξα β= ) )  
1 1 2 2 ( , ) ( , )e T h e T h=
) )  
Case 2: 
When | |RL Tr≥ , the MM sends all signers and verifiers in the system the revocation list which is 





γ +← ∈ . After 
receiving the revocation list RL , the group public key gpk and the new private keys can be easily 
updated by the non-revoked users [BBS2004].  
Given the group public key 1 2( , , , )gpk g g g w= and a revoked private key *1 1( , )A x RL∈ , the new 
group public key can be constructed as 
1 2( , . , )newgpk g g g w=
) ) ) )  
where *1 1( )g Aϕ=
) , *2 1g A=
) , 1 2( , )g e g g=
) ) ) )  and 1*2 1( )
xw g A −= ⋅) . 
Given a revoked private key *1 1( , )A x RL∈ , the new private key for an unrevoked vehicle i can be 
constructed as ( , )i iA x
)
, where 1 11/( ) 1/( )*1( ) /i i
x x x x




The proofs of these two results can be found in [BBS2004]. Note that all keys in the RL can also be 
updated at once rather than updated one by one. 
    Synchronizing the key update for all the group members is difficult. If some cars have updated 
their keys, while some haven’t, then those who don’t have new keys cannot verify the messages 
signed by the new keys. Similarly, the message might be rejected if the sender doesn’t have the latest 
keys. One possible solution is to add a version number to the group public keys and the message 
format and allow receivers to accept messages signed with the keys several (such as 2) versions 
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behind. Once a newer version of the group public key is found from other senders, the receiver will 
try to update its own group key as soon as possible. Note that this approach might reduce the security 
level since this extends the life time of the revoked malicious users, because they can still use their 
old group public keys to sign the messages for some time.  
2.2.3 Message Length 
The length of the OBU message can be expressed as: 
_msg OBU groupID payload sigL L L L= + + . 
Since p  is a 163-bit prime and the elements of G1 are 164 bits long, 3 164 6 163 1470sigL = × + × =  bits = 
184 bytes. Thus _msg OBUL  = 4 + 100 + 184 =  288 bytes.  
2.2.4 Analysis of the Membership Revocation and Tracing Efficiency 
The efficiency of the membership revocation and tracing schemes is a key requirement to the success 
of any vehicular application since users are exposed to serious risks if malicious users conduct 
dangerous activity or adversaries impersonate a compromised yet legitimate group member. These 
behaviors have been seen to be common in our daily life. Thus, we need to improve the performance 
of membership revocation and tracing schemes as much as possible. In this subsection, we evaluate 
the efficiency of membership revocation and tracing schemes in the proposed protocol. 
When a vehicle is compromised, the certificates that the vehicle owns need to be revoked in order 
to prevent the potential threats from happening. In [RH2005], a total of 43,800 anonymous 
certificates have to be put in the CRL once the vehicle is discovered compromised. The storage cost 
of the CRL is 43,800KB  1 per vehicle revoked. In our proposed membership revocation scheme, when 
the number of revoked nodes is less than a threshold Tr , an iA  that is 164 bits long is put in the 
revocation list for each revoked vehicle. When the number of revoked nodes is greater than Tr , a pair 
( * ,i iA x ) needs to be put in the CRL when a vehicle is discovered compromised. Since the length of 
the element in 2G is 490 bits long, the storage cost of the CRL in this case is 653 (which is 490+163) 
bits per vehicle. Therefore, we can see the size of the CRL is reduced, as compared with [RH2005]. 
The larger the number of revoked vehicle certificates in the CRL the more storage the proposed 
                                                     
1 The size of a X.509 public key certificate is about 1KB [AF1999]. 
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membership revocation scheme can save. This is extremely important since the CRL should be 
distributed to each OBU and RSU in order to avoid contacting a centralized CRL authority center. A 
reduction of the storage cost is also a reduction in bandwidth, which alleviates the transmission 
burden. 
As discussed in Section 1.1, Raya, et al. in [RJPAH2006] proposed a way to reduce the storage cost 
of CRL by using a tamper-proof device to erase the stored anonymous certificates and stop signing 
messages automatically. This technique can be applied to our group signature based scheme as well. 
In this case, the distribution of CRL over the Internet can be saved for both schemes. However, once a 
node is discovered to be an attacker and needs to be revoked later, how to find where the attacker is 
and how to send the revoke message to the attacker is an open problem. In addition, if the attacker 
cuts the communication channel with the party who is responsible for releasing revoking messages, 
the attacker will not receive the revoke message and then can successfully refuse to revoke himself.  
Furthermore, for identity tracing in exceptional cases, in [RH2005] the authority has to keep all the 
anonymous certificates for each vehicle in the administrative region, which results in a high storage 
cost of 43,800KB n× , where n  is the total number of vehicles (probably millions of cars) in the 
system. The proposed membership tracing scheme in this study needs to maintain a table 
containing *iA , ix  and the corresponding real identity for each vehicle. Each entry in this table is 789 
bits long if the identity of the vehicle is 136 bits (the VIN of a vehicle is a 17 character number made 
up of both alpha and numeric characters). Thus, the storage cost for the proposed scheme 
is 789  n bits× , which is a considerable storage saving.  
[RH2005] indeed provides a work around to reduce its high storage cost. It is mentioned in the 
paper that a master key can be used to generate all the anonymous keys. However, the paper did not 
discuss how the anonymous keys can be derived and whether the anonymous keys can be matched to 
the master key in an efficient way. Therefore, for the identity tracing process, the authority has to go 
through the whole master key set sequentially and regenerate the corresponding anonymous keys. In 
this way, this workaround has a less efficient searching process compared with the original 
anonymous key based tracing process even if the storage cost is reduced. Considering the high 
frequency of accidents happening everyday, it is important to maintain a low identity tracing 
overhead. We, therefore, have compared our storage cost with the storage cost of the approach 
discussed in the main part of [RH2005]. 
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2.3 Proposed Protocol between OBUs and RSUs 
2.3.1 Message Format 
We define the packet format of the safety messages sent by RSUs as follows: 
Table 2-4.  Packet format for RSU messages 
Type ID Payload Signature ID String 
2 bytes 100 bytes 41 bytes 40 byes 
 
Type ID represents the type of message that is being sent. The first two parts are signed by RSU 
which become the ‘Signature’ part. The ‘ID string’ is a 40-byte-long string which works as the public 
key of the message sender. It must include the following information: the name of the road side 
device; the authorized geographical region to operate; the authorized message types such as 
‘maximum curve turning speed notification’ or ‘road under construction notification’. Again, the 
payload part includes an 8 byte timestamp information with a resolution of milliseconds that is used 
to deal with message replay attacks as briefly discussed in section 2.2.1. The size of the signature will 
be discussed later. 
2.3.2 Security Protocol for RSU and OBU Communication 
The proposed protocol contains the following phases, which can also be found in [BLMQ2005]. The 
parameters used below such as 1 2, , TG G G , , ,g pγ , pubP  are the same as the ones used in the protocol for 
OBU to OBU communication.  
2.3.2.1 Private key generation 
There is a unique identity string assigned for each RSU according to its properties. The MM chooses 
two hash functions * *1 1:{0,1} pH G Z× → , and * *2 :{0,1} pH Z→ . The MM then computes the private key 
iID







γ +←  
and sends it to the RSU through a secure communication channel. 1H , 2H are system parameters open 




Before sending each safety message, RSU signs the message M with the procedure described below: 
Pick a random value *
R
px Z← . 
Compute x Tr g G← ∈ .  




+← ∈  .  
The signature σ  is then the pair * 1( , ) ph S Z Gσ σ ∈ × . Finally, formulate the message according to 
Table 2-4 and send it out.  
2.3.2.3 Verification 
Any vehicle receiving a message from a RSU will first guarantee that the senders are working under 
the authorized domain. The vehicle compares the physical location of the message sender with the 
location information in the RSU’s identity string. Then, the vehicle compares the type ID in the 
received message with the properties stated in the identity string to see if this type of message is 
authenticated for this unit. For example, if the RSU designed for the curve speed warning is 
nonetheless sending a message like ‘sharp turn ahead’. The vehicle should also check the timestamp 
of the message to make sure the message is freshly generated and is not a duplicate of a previously 
received message. If the message comes late, which is after the allowed time range, the message is 
ignored. Finally, the vehicle checks the validity of the message signature by computing  
2 ( )
1 2( , ( , ) )i
H ID h
pubh H M e S g P g σσ σ
−= ⋅)%  
to see if h hσ σ=% , where hσ  is from the signature σ . If the equation holds, the vehicle accepts the 
message; otherwise, the vehicle drops it. 
2.3.2.4 Membership revocation  
Once an RSU is discovered compromised by the management authority, it should be revoked from 
the system. This could be done by the revocation scheme that is proposed in [BF2001]. The basic idea 
is that there is a ‘current date’ information in the RSU’s public key. Normal RSUs will get a fresh 
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private key every day from the trusted authority. The revocation of an RSU is done simply by 
stopping issuing new private keys for it. The downside of the revocation scheme is that the revocation 
cannot be done in a real-time manner. To achieve real-time revocation, the public keys of revoked 
RSUs can always be put in the CRL. The receivers can check whether a certain RSU has been 
revoked or not by comparing its ID string with the ones in the CRL. 
2.3.3 Message Length 
The length of an RSU message can be calculated as: 
_msg RSU typeID payload sig IDL L L L L= + + +  
where the order p is 163 bits long and elements of 1G  are 164 bits long; thus the size of the signature 
σ is 41 bytes long. Finally, _msg RSUL = 2 + 100 + 41 + 40 = 183 bytes.  
2.3.4 Security Analysis 
Using the provably secure ID-based signature scheme in [BLMQ2005] allows the RSU to sign an 
arbitrary number of messages by guaranteeing unforgeability, authentication, data integrity, and non-
repudiation. We refer to [BLMQ2005] for more comprehensive security analysis of these security 
requirements. In this section, we analyze the proposed protocol in the aspects of (1) RSU replication 
attack prevention, and (2) replay attack prevention. 
Prevention of RSU replication attack: The message from an RSU has an “ID” field which keeps the 
RSU's original physical location as well as the type of the traffic management offered by the RSU. 
Upon receipt of the message, the OBU compares the physical location of the OBU with the location 
information in the RSU's ID string. If the distance is farther than RSU's transmission range, the OBU 
ignores the message. Therefore by this means, the vehicles outside the original coverage range of the 
RSU can discover the replication attack. If the RSU is relocated by the malicious user in a place 
which is within the coverage range of the original legitimate RSU, the proposed scheme cannot detect 
such behavior. Therefore, a physical position detection device is needed to estimate the accuracy of 
the location information to assist guarding against this type of replica attack. This device may use a 
combination of GPS, differential correction, dead reckoning and other techniques as appropriate 
[IEEE1609.2-2006]. To verify the message, the OBU also needs to compare the type ID in the 
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received message with the corresponding property part specified in the ID string of the RSU. If the 
type ID cannot match the property, the message will be ignored. 
Prevention of replay attack: With a replay attack, an adversary replays the intercepted message 
from an RSU in order to impersonate a legitimate RSU. It cannot work in the proposed protocol 
because of the time stamp check in the verification procedure. 
2.3.5 Analysis of the Communication Overhead 
By using an ID based signature scheme, the additional cryptographic load for a signed message is a 
result of the signature of the message and the public ID string, which is 41 + 40 = 81 bytes. For 
traditional PKI based signature schemes, the additional load is a result of the length of the public key 
certificate and the signature of the message. Among existing digital signature schemes such as RSA, 
DSA [USDoC], ECDSA [ANSI X9.62-2005], and BLS [BLS2001], the most appropriate candidate 
for the VANET application in terms of the packet overhead and the verification time is ECDSA. The 
minimum additional space caused by the use of 224-bit ECDSA is 181 bytes for each message, 
including the digital signature (which is 56 bytes [IEEE1609.2-2006]), and the public key certificate 
(which is 125 bytes [IEEE1609.2-2006]). Therefore, we can see there is an improvement on the 
communication overhead by deploying ID based signature schemes.  
2.4 Group Division 
It is desirable to divide the vehicles around the world into several groups for ease of management. 
There are many possible ways to do this. First, it is natural to divide groups according to places of 
registration. For example, all vehicles registered in Ontario, Canada could belong to the same group. 
They share the same group public key and their private keys are issued by the local transportation 
regulation centers in Ontario. The vehicles have to store the public key information of other provinces 
as well in order to verify the messages sent by the vehicles coming from other provinces.  
Another possible division is manufacturer based. The vehicles produced by each manufacturer 
belong to the same group. Similarly, vehicles within communication range may come from different 
groups. Therefore, every vehicle is also installed with the group public keys of other manufacturers. 
These two division methods are easy to understand and implement. However, one drawback is 
whenever the group public keys are updated, all vehicles around the world should be notified to 
update their local information of the updated group public keys.  
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To solve this problem, it is possible to divide the vehicles according to their current geographic 
region. For example, all the vehicles driving in Ontario, Canada belong to the same group. Then the 
revocation only needs to be done within a single group domain without affecting groups in other 
provinces. Each vehicle only has to store one public key, namely the one being used in this province. 
In this division, cars traveling across the border of a geographic group (such as the border of 
provinces or countries) need to update their group public key and private key information. This could 
be done by setting an RSU at the border. The RSU and the new coming vehicles establish a secure 
communication channel by using an existing mutual authentication and key agreement protocol such 
as Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol secured by ID-based signature scheme and the group 
signature scheme. The RSU then could send the new keying materials to the new comer encrypted by 
the shared secret key.  
2.5 Performance Evaluation 
We conducted simulations using the ns-2 simulator [USC] to evaluate the performance and feasibility 
of the proposed GSIS security protocol. We use 802.11a to approximate the 802.11p protocol as was 
done in [RH2005]. In order to fully estimate the real-world road environment and vehicular traffic, 
two road scenarios are simulated. For the city environment, we use the mobility model generation 
tool developed by [SJ2004] which is specialized to generate realistic traffic scenario files for the ns-2 
platform. This tool makes use of the publicly available TIGER (Topologically Integrated Geographic 
Encoding and Referencing) database from the U.S. Census Bureau, giving detailed street maps of the 
entire United States. The map we are using is shown below in Figure 2-1 which corresponds to the 
Afton Oaks area, Houston, TX. Vehicles are first scattered randomly on one intersection of the roads 
and repeatedly move towards another randomly selected intersection along the path constrained by 
the map. Vehicles are driving with a random speed with fluctuation range of 5 miles/hr according to 
the road speed limit that ranges from 35-75 miles/hr. The second road scenario we are simulating is a 
straight bi-directional six lane highway, where vehicles are driving with their speed within the range 
of 100 ± 10 km/hr. (Because routine safety messages from the opposite driving direction are ignored 
in our scheme, the actual scenario we simulated was a three-lane highway with a single driving 
direction. In a real world deployment, vehicles can distinguish those on the opposite of the road from 
the ‘direction’ information incorporated in safety messages.) RSUs are located every 500 meters 
along the road side sending messages every 300 ms. The simulation time is 30 s. (We have tested 
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longer simulation times such as 100 s. They return similar results to those of 30 s; we thus choose 30 
s as the simulation time.)  
 
Figure 2-1. City map with span of 1000m 
Other simulation parameters are listed in Table 2-5. Pause time is a special parameter in the ns-2 
simulator that gives the waiting interval between the times when vehicles reach one destination and 
when they head for another destination. Buffer size is the length of the queue for vehicles to store 
incoming messages. The message loss ratio is related to the distribution of the arriving messages, the 
message arrival rate, the message processing time and the length of the queue. If we approximate 
message arrivals as being uniformly spaced, and note that the message processing time is usually 
higher than the message inter-arrival time, we see that the message loss ratio is independent of the 
length of the queue.  Therefore, in our simulation we set the length of the queue to be 2 instead of a 
larger value in order to reduce the time each message waits in the queue. The cryptographic signing 
and verification delays are estimated based on the numbers provided by [S2007] with a 3 GHz 




Table 2-5.  Simulation configurations 
City simulation area 1000 m x 1000 m 
Highway simulation area 2500 m x 30 m  
Communication range 300 m 
Message interval 300 ms 
Simulation time 100 s 
Channel bandwidth 6 Mb/s 
Wireless communication protocol 802.11a 
Pause time 0 s 
Buffer size 2 
Group Signature verification delay2 11 ms 
Group Signature signing delay2 negligible 
IBE verification delay2 5.7 ms    
IBE signing delay2 0.6 ms 
 
The performance metrics taken in the simulation are the average Message Delay (MD) and average 
Message Loss Ratio (MLR), and are expressed as follows: 
_
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where D is the sampled simulation area in which the node’s communication range has full coverage. 
DN  is the number of nodes in D; _sent nM is the number of messages sent by node n; nK is the number 
of adjacent vehicles within n’s communication range; _n msignT  is the time used for n to sign message m; 
n_m_k represents the message m which is sent by n and received by k; _ _n m kL is the length of the queue 
in k when message m sent by n arrives. So, we can see the metric of MD here is composed of all the 
periods from the moment that the data message is formed at the sender’s side in the application layer 
to the moment that the receiving vehicle has the opportunity to react to the received data.  
                                                     
2 As in [BBS2004], the verification process of the group signature includes 1 non-preprocessable pairing plus 4 non-preprocessable multi-
exponentiations in 1G , plus 1 preprocessable multi-exponentiation in 2G , and 1 non-preprocessable multi-exponentiation in TG . The 
signing process includes 8 precomputable exponentiations and therefore the time is neglected. The IBE verification contains 
1 preprocessable pairing, and 1 non-preprocessable exponentiation in TG  based on the fact that the vehicle will receive many messages 
from one RSU. The IBE signing process contains 1 non-preprocessable exponentiation in 1G .  The preprocessable multi-exponentiation in 
2G  and the non-preprocessable multi-exponentiation in 1G  are estimated to be twice the time for 1 non-preprocessable multi-
exponentiation in 1G . From [S2007], the time to do 1 non-preprocessable pairing is 6.2 ms and 4.5 ms for 1 preprocessable pairing. The 
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where nconsumedM  represents the number of messages consumed by node n in the application layer;  
n
arrivedM represents the number of messages that are received by node n  in the MAC layer. Here we 
only consider the message loss caused by delays due to the security protocol rather than the wireless 
transmission channel such as MAC layer contention. Note that the message will be lost and will not 
be consumed if the queue is full when the message arrival rate is higher than the message verification 
rate.  
Two sets of experiments are conducted respectively to analyze the impacts of having different 
traffic loads and cryptographic algorithm processing speeds. 
2.5.1 Impact of Traffic load 
The vehicle density on the road is the major impact on system performance since it is related to the 
total number of messages received by each vehicle. Previous studies consider the effect brought by 
the actual vehicle density on the road such as /  nodes km or 2/nodes km . However they did not consider 
the varying relationship between the communication range and the actual vehicle density. According 
to [USDoT2006], the denser the traffic is, the shorter the communication range (or a smaller radiation 
power) should be to achieve an acceptable packet loss ratio. Therefore, the number of messages 
received by a certain vehicle within its communication range should be taken into account, when 
considering the impact on the system performance. Thus, this study takes the average number of 
neighboring vehicles within the communication range of each vehicle as the traffic load instead of the 
number of vehicles within one kilometer. Simulation results are shown in Figure 2-2 and Figure 2-3. 
It can be seen that with the increase of traffic load (i.e., the number of vehicles within the 
communication range), MD is increasing but is smaller than the maximum allowable message end-to-
end transmission latency which is 100 ms, as defined in [USDoT2006]. However, MLR increases 
dramatically when the traffic load is increasing. It is notable that a large number of messages are lost. 
This is because with the increase of the traffic load, the message arrival rate will be higher than the 
message consumption rate, which makes the receiver’s buffer fill. 
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Figure 2-2. Impact of traffic load on the message end-to-end delay 























Figure 2-3. Impact of traffic load on the message loss ratio 
2.5.2 Impact of Cryptographic Signature Verification Delay 
Another important factor that determines the performance of a security protocol is its cryptographic 
efficiency. However, cryptographic algorithm processing speed is a non-determinate issue which 
depends highly on the level of the hardware. A quicker processor can achieve much higher processing 
speed. The group signature verification delay is estimated to be 11 ms in this study. Therefore, in this 
set of experiments, the group signature verification delay, which is the most important element in our 
security protocol, is varied from 1 ms to 13 ms. Since group signature verification delay is the 
bottleneck of all cryptographic operations, other cryptographic processing times are kept the same in 
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this set of experiments.  Normal traffic load in the city and highway environment is simulated, where 
there are around 60 vehicles within communication range. Simulation results are shown in Figure 2-4 
and Figure 2-5. 
It can be seen that MD and MLR increase when the cryptographic operation cost becomes larger. 
Also, the MLR is significantly increased after the signature verification latency reaches a certain 
value when the incoming messages can not be verified since the message arrival rate is higher than 
the message verification rate. As shown in Figure 2-5, the MLR has reached 69% when the 
verification time is 13 ms even in normal traffic load. Reasonable performance can be achieved when 
the verification delay is below 3 ms.  




























Figure 2-4. Impact of the signature verification latency on message end to end delay 




























Figure 2-5. Impact of the signature verification latency on message loss ratio 
In summary, the simulation results show that the proposed GSIS scheme can only meet the 
communication requirements under the condition that vehicles are equipped with fast computational 
devices and under a light traffic load scenario. Hardware implementation of the group signature is 
desired to achieve acceptable performances under all kinds of traffic loads, since the group signature 
verification time can, therefore, be reduced dramatically.  
The GSIS scheme meets the following security requirements. It guarantees the message integrity. It 
provides anonymous vehicle authentication, while at the same time enables vehicles’ identity tracing 
in exceptional cases. It deals with message replay attack. The GSIS scheme does not cover the 
message authenticity requirement because it does include a mechanism to detect the node sending 
valid but fake messages.  
In addition, by observing contents of the traffic messages such as the position information, two 
messages can still be linked together by global observers based on the high frequency of sending 
messages. This is because the position of the vehicles won’t change too much in 300 ms. This 
problem happens to PKI based security protocol as well. How to prevent this type of attack is left for 
future work.  
In the next Chapter, an enhanced protocol called TSVC is proposed to improve the system 
performance in terms of the message end to end delay, and especially the message loss ratio, without 
influencing the security requirements. TSVC can also be applied to enhance the performance of the 




Performance Enhancement for Secure Vehicular Communications 
The studies on security and anonymity between OBUs and OBUs in VANETs can mainly be 
divided into two categories. The first is by way of the traditional PKI-based security architectures 
[RH2005, DoT2006], while the other is a group signature based security scheme as in the GSIS 
protocol. In both of these schemes, each message needs to be signed by the sender before it is sent, 
and the receiver needs to verify the message when it is received. According to DSRC [DoT_DSRC], a 
vehicle sends each message within a time interval of 100 ms to 300 ms. Generating a signature every 
100 ms is not a problem for current hardware techniques. However, in the case that 50-120 cars are 
within the communication range, the receiver needs to verify around 500-1200 messages per second, 
which will lead to high computation burden to the receivers consuming these messages. Signing and 
verifying each message can certainly achieve secure communication; however, the corresponding 
cryptographic operations incur some computational overhead which makes them not scalable to the 
traffic density. Therefore, the verification algorithms are required to be very fast, such that the 
incoming messages can be processed with limited message loss. Otherwise, a large number of 
messages will be lost and sent in vain, as shown from the simulation result in section 2.5. 
Furthermore, in the traditional PKI-based security architecture, each packet must contain the public 
key of the sender and the corresponding certificate. The security overhead is usually longer than the 
message content and takes up a significant portion of the packet size.  
In addition to achieving the satisfied security level and anonymity requirements, the design of a 
security protocol in VANETs must take certain issues into consideration, such as the signature 
overhead of each packet, packet sending rate, and the requirements for packet loss rate and message 
latency [DoT2006]. These issues are critical and must be well addressed before the developed scheme 
can be applied to practical vehicular communications.  
To consider all the design requirements mentioned above without compromising the security and 
anonymity level, this chapter introduces a new enhanced security scheme, called TSVC (TESLA 
based Secure Vehicular Communication) protocol. Informed by the TESLA (Timed Efficient Stream 
Loss-tolerant Authentication) mechanism [PCTS2002], with the exception of the first message 
received from a certain OBU, the proposed protocol needs to do only symmetric MAC operations at 
the receiver, which is sufficient to authenticate the source of the message, instead of performing any 
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asymmetric verification whenever a message is received. The proposed TSVC scheme can be applied 
to both the reported PKI based security schemes as well as the GSIS security protocol. Similar to 
TESLA, in TSVC, only a short MAC tag is attached to each message. The extra message length and 
the bandwidth overhead due to the security mechanism can be reduced. Moreover, the enhanced 
protocol reduces the message loss ratio, which is almost independent of the traffic density.  
We will show by extensive simulation that the proposed TSVC protocol significantly reduces 
message loss ratio compared to the existing PKI based security protocols as well as the GSIS protocol, 
especially when the traffic is becoming denser, while maintaining acceptable message latency. The 
TSVC scheme is feasible due to the unique features of VANETs, such as a fixed message release 
interval, and temporally stable geographical groups, which will be discussed later.  
3.1 Related work 
One work in the literature has aimed to reduce the overhead of the security protocol in a VANET, 
which is the aggregate signature based scheme [RAH2006]. In [RAH2006], the authors proposed a 
secure traffic aggregation scheme to minimize the communication overhead and initiate a tradeoff 
between security and efficiency. First, the map or the geographic region is dissected into 
predetermined small cells (such as every 400 meters along the road), each of which determines a 
dynamic vehicle group. A unique group leader is automatically elected as the one who is the closest 
to the geographic center of the cell. The dissemination of messages is delegated to each group leader 
who performs message aggregation for all the vehicles in the group and forwards the message to the 
neighbor groups. Although this scheme may yield low communication overhead, the vehicle closest 
to the center of a cell could change frequently, leading to a frequent update of the group leader of a 
cell (e.g. once every few seconds). The update of the group leader consumes all the effort such as the 
negotiation and reselection of the leader, and the aggregation of new signatures. Therefore, the 
approach leaves some space to be improved in terms of its efficiency and practical applicability. 
Similar to [RAH2006], TSVC aims to reduce the overhead incurred in the security protocol without 
compromising the security performance. However, we approach the problem from a totally different 
angle. TSVC follows a more natural and dynamic approach to group the vehicles on the road; 
moreover, a group leader is not required, which largely reduces the resultant computation overhead in 




Before the proposed security scheme is presented, some preliminaries throughout the protocol are 
introduced here. 
3.2.1 One Way Hash Chain  
One way hash chains were first proposed by Lamport in 1981 [L1981] for secure password 
authentication, and quickly became an important cryptographic primitive in many other applications, 
such as micropayment systems [RS1996], secure data forwarding in wireless ad hoc networks 
[HAKL2005], and stream data authentication [GM2001]  
A one way hash chain is a repeated application of a hash function ( )H x  to a randomly selected 
seed S , where ( )H x has the property that given x , it is easy to compute ( )H x and given ( )H x , it is 
computationally hard to compute x . A hash chain is denoted as 1 2, ,..., nh h h , where 1 2( )h H h= , 
1 ( )i ih H h− = , nh S= . 1h  is called the tip or the commitment of the chain. A node serving as the source 
can apply the hash chain by revealing the chain elements in the opposite order: 
first 1 2, then ,..., then nh h h . 1h  is usually signed using a normal signature scheme. By checking that 
( ), where j ii jh H h i j
−= < , the receiver can determine that jh is indeed an element in the chain sent by 
the same source as 1h .  
3.2.2 TESLA authentication scheme 
TESLA was first proposed by A. Perrig et al. [PCTS2002], which is an efficient and message-loss 
tolerant protocol for broadcast authentication with low communication and computation overhead. It 
is widely used in the area of sensor networks [PSWCT2002]. With TESLA, the elements in a one 
way hash chain are used as cryptographic keys in the MAC operations. A sender sends the key 
disclosure schedule information to the receivers, which includes a time interval schedule to disclose 
one-way hash chain elements, a key disclosure delay, and a key commitment. This information, as 
well as the tip, is signed with any conventional digital signature scheme, such as RSA, or the 
ElGamal signature scheme. Then, for the following messages, the sender attaches a MAC tag to each 
message iM . This MAC tag is derived using the next corresponding MAC key in the hash chain. Each 
key corresponds to a certain time interval. The key remains secret for the next (d – 1) intervals, where 
d is the key disclosure delay. Thus, the messages sent in interval j will disclose the keys for interval (j 
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– d). So, the broadcast message iM sent in interval j is encapsulated in packet iP , which is expressed 
as || ( ) ||
ji h i j d
M MAC M h − , where jh is the MAC key in interval j. Thus, message iM can be 
authenticated after a time delay, once the key jh is released in interval (j + d). By checking the 
validity of the MAC tag of a message, one can make sure that the message originated from the same 
source as the previous message.  
TESLA scheme requires only loose synchronization among the nodes. The disadvantage of TESLA 
is the delayed message authentication.   
3.3 TSVC in a nutshell 
We first assume that each vehicle is able to estimate the message transmission delay through the 
traffic density information. We also assume all the vehicles have synchronized clocks to millisecond 
accuracy, for example, through a central satellite. We divide the message authentication into two 
categories based on the message type: routine messages and emergency messages, where the former 
one obviously dominates the total traffic amount while the latter one is much less frequent.  
The general idea of the proposed approach on performance enhancement for the routine traffic 
related messages is described as follows. Each sender generates a hash chain in advance. The 
elements of this chain are used as MAC keys. A signature is produced for the first message with a 
conventional public key signature scheme. For the following messages, on the other hand, the MAC 
tag of each message is computed with the corresponding key in the hash chain, which is disclosed 
after a short delay. Messages can be authenticated when the MAC keys are released. Based on the 
expected transmission delay of each message along with the serial number of the key used in a hash 
chain and the pre-shared key release schedule information, the receiver can check whether or not the 
next hash key used to generate the MAC tag of the received message has been released. If so, the 
message should be discarded to prevent a message forgery attack. 
Emergency messages such as ‘accident ahead’ or ‘emergency braking’ that are sent with a much 
lower frequency are processed in a higher priority. Therefore, emergency messages sending from both 
directions of the roads are signed and verified with normal signature schemes such as RSA, from 
which the best security assurance, a constant delay and low loss ratio can be achieved. 
The detailed security protocol is given in the next section. 
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3.4 Proposed TSVC Protocol 
3.4.1 Vehicle Group Formation 
One of the unique features of VANETs is that the vehicles driving on the highway maintain a 
temporally stable relative distance with the neighboring vehicles. Since the communication range is 
typically 250 m-1000 m, and as we stated in section 2.1.1, routine traffic messages coming from the 
other direction of the road are not taken into consideration, this neighborhood relationship could last 
from several seconds to several minutes according to the driving speed of an individual car. By taking 
advantage of this property, we can group the cars according to their physical locations.  
For a specific vehicle V , all the other vehicles that are within its one-hop communication range are 
defined as in the same group as v as shown in Figure 3-1. Vehicle 1N , 2N  and V  form a group 
centered by vehicle V . Obviously a car can belong to many different groups. The group relationship 
is dynamic and is updated when any other car comes into the communication range or any group 




Figure 3-1. Dynamic virtual vehicle group formation 
3.4.2 TSVC protocol 
As mentioned above, the TSVC protocol can be applied to both of the two main streams of the 
existed security protocols. For ease of explanation, we first show how to combine the TSVC scheme 
with the anonymous PKI-based security schemes as discussed in [RH2005], which we call the TSVC-
enhanced PKI-based security scheme. The combination of TSVC and GSIS will be discussed in 
section 3.5.4.  
Let all the vehicles be installed with a list of anonymous public key pairs ,i iPK SK< >  and the 
corresponding anonymous certificates iCert  in the vehicle registration phase or annual check-up time. 
 
 40 
Each pair of keys has a short life time, e.g., a few minutes. Each vehicle has to generate a hash chain 
1 2, ,..., nh h h  initiated from a random seed S, where nh S= , and ( )j ii jh H h−=  with i j< . Each element in 
the hash chain is used to generate one MAC code for each message. Hash keys will be released after a 
short delay δ which we call the key disclosure delay. For simplicity, we assume the number of 
messages each MAC key works on is 1; thus, each hash element will generate one MAC code for one 
message. Also, we set the time interval in the TESLA scheme as the packet release interval which 
means one packet, and its corresponding key, are transmitted during each time interval by each OBU. 
The length of the hash chain can be predetermined according to the life time of each anonymous 
certificate and the message sending interval. Once the anonymous public key pairs are updated, a new 
chain is initiated and comes into use. Note that all the hash chains can be initialized in advance before 
going into function to reduce system operation delay. Let the routine safety messages to be sent by a 
vehicle be denoted as 1 2, ,..., kM M M . Let messages be launched with a fixed interval of 300ms. The 
message authentication process is shown below in Figure 3-2, where iP represents packet i .  
1h 2h 3h 4h





Figure 3-2.  Relationship between a hash chain and the corresponding packets 
There are two categories of packets in the TSVC scheme. The first category are the data packets 
which are used for sending data information while the second category are the key release packets 
(KRP), denoted as _ iKr P , which are used for releasing the MAC keys. The messages are released 
every 100 ms ~ 300 ms. Considering the packet transmission time and the cryptographic delays, in 
order to meet the maximum allowed message latency that is 100 ms [USDoT2006], instead of 
combining the data and keys in the same packet, we divide them into two packets. Each KRP is 
disclosed a fixed time δ  after the previous data packet is released. 
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Figure 3-3. The diagram of the TSVC protocol 
 The proposed security protocol is illustrated in Figure 3-3. Each sender v generates the MAC tag 
of jM using jh as the MAC key. The resulting data packets have the following format: 
, , , ( ) ,  1
jj j h j
P PVID M index MAC M j=< > ≥  
where PVID is the pseudo ID of vehicle v, which is kept in accordance with the IDs that are being 
used in the current public key certificate vCert ; jM is safety message j ; index  is the ordered packet 
number: i.e. 1 in 1P . Note that the timestamp when the sender sends jP is included in jM . When the 
first packet is received from a certain vehicle, the receivers create an entry for source v  in their local 
data base in the form of  
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( ,  ,  _ ,  _ ,  _ ,  ) vENTRY PVID msg packet index MAC tag hash key lifetime=  
to synchronize the later packets coming from the same source, where lifetime is the expiration time of 
a certain message that can be computed from the time stamp information in the message payload part. 
The receivers fill in the PVID , msg , _packet index , _MAC tag , and the lifetime  fields and leave the 
_hash key  part blank. The receivers cannot verify the first data packet until they receive the first KRP.  
After the first data packet is sent, the sender v  prepares the first KRP by signing the tip of the hash 
chain 1h  using a traditional public key based signature scheme. The first key release packet is signed 
by the traditional PKI scheme and has the following format: 
1 1 1 1 1_ , ( , , ), , , ,vSK vkr P PVID Sig h index T h index T Cert=< >
% %  
where 1h  is the key used to generate the MAC tag of the first message 1M , vCert is the currently used 
anonymous certificate, index  is the ordered number of the hash chain element: i.e. 1 in 1_kr P , 
and 1T% is the time when 1_kr P  is sent. 1T%  is an 8-byte variable with a resolution of milliseconds. Given 
this time information of when this first hash key is released and the fixed key released delay, the 
receivers are able to know the release time of the following hash keys. 1_kr P  will be released δ time 
later than  1P .  
Once 1_kr P  arrives, the receivers perform the following verification: 
?
1 1 1( , , , ( , , )) 1,v vPK SKVer h index T Sig h index T =
% %  where 1index =  
1
?
1 1( ) _hMAC msg MAC tag=  
where 1msg  and 1_MAC tag are the previously stored values.  
If the above verification fails, the packet is dropped; otherwise, the receivers fill in the 
_hash key field in the corresponding entry and start consuming 1M .  
The following KRPs have the following format: 
_ , , , 1j jkr P PVID h index j j=< = > >  
We can see that the following KRPs are not signed. Note that all the KRPs are released δ  time 
later than the previous data packets.  
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 When receiving data packet jP , when j > 1, the receivers simply update the corresponding entry for 
vehicle v  without trying to verify the messages. As soon as the next key release packet _ jkr P  arrives, 
the receivers start to verify the previous data packet. Before doing that, the receivers will first find the 
corresponding entry for vehicle v  and check the legitimacy of the hash chain, which is done by 
checking if 1( )j jH h h −= , where 1jh −  is the previously stored _hash key  field in the entry. If the equation 
does not hold, the packet _ jkr P  is dropped; otherwise, the receivers start to validate the data 




MAC msg MAC tag= . 
Again jmsg  and _ jMAC tag  are the previously stored values in the database. If the verification 
succeeds, jM is accepted and consumed by the application layer, and the vENTRY is updated by filling 
in the field _hash key with jh ; if the verification fails, jP  is dropped.  
In summary, the proposed protocol can achieve the same guarantee for message integrity, 
anonymity, and authenticity as the traditional PKI based schemes do. In spite of the anonymity for the 
public receivers, the protocol can well maintain a conditional traceability property for authorities such 
as police, because all the accepted messages can be tied uniquely to an anonymous public key and the 
certificate of its sender. Thus, by checking this unique public key certificate, the authority can trace 
the unique real-world identity of the message sender as can be done in the traditional PKI based 
schemes.  
3.4.3 Security requirement and Key Release Delay δ  
The security requirement to prevent message forgery attacks for the proposed scheme is that the key 
release waiting time should be longer than the time for a message to travel from the source to all 
recipients. If any receiver r can receive the released key before the original data packet arrives at 
another receiver r% , then receiver r , who holds the key, can forge a message by generating a valid 
MAC tag to this message and sending the tagged message to r% . Note that this forged message can 
pass r% ’s verification. This situation can be avoided by choosing the key release delayδ  properly. In 
the vehicular communications with IEEE 802.11p, since the longest transmission range is about 1000 
m, δ should be slightly greater than the time for a message to travel for 1000 m in the wireless 
channel. In [DoT2006], the communication latency is identified as about 10 ms. In our scheme, 
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therefore, δ is set to be 70 ms, which is approximately several times the communication latency for 
the concern to achieve a higher level of security and at the same time to meet the requirement of the 
maximum allowable message latency. (This number is derived from the simulation results in section 
3.6.2 where the biggest message end to end delay is measured 30 ms higher than the key release 
delay). This figure will be verified through simulation as presented in section 3.6.  
Before performing a normal message authentication process as discussed above, the validity of the 
messages needs to be checked to see if the security requirement can be met. This means the receiver 
has to know which interval the data packet belongs to and whether the corresponding key has been 
released already. This can be derived from the pre-shared key-disclosure schedule information and 
the index of the hash key. If yes, the packet is dropped without trying to authenticate it. The receivers 
have no idea of the validity of the first data packet. When 1_kr P  arrives is checked valid, the 
receivers can trace back to see if 1P was received δ time earlier than 1_kr P . If not, 1P should be 
deleted immediately.  
Note that due to the stringent time requirement of the real-time applications in VANETs, late or 
outdated messages should be dropped. Therefore, if a message arrives after the maximum allowable 
latency such as the human’s maximum reaction time, this message should be dropped without putting 
it into the buffer.  
3.5 Protocol Analysis  
3.5.1 Group Membership Fluctuation  
We have assumed that the neighborhood of each car is not fluctuating seriously, but memberships are 
occasionally subject to fluctuations. Once car v leaves the transmission range of v’, v’ keeps the 
information record of v for a short while in order to avoid frequent update of the group members. 
When car v joins the group of v’, v needs to catch up with the previously released hash chain MAC 
keys sent by v’. This can be achieved by checking if a new routine safety message is coming from an 
unknown party. If a newcomer joins, v’ needs to rebroadcast the authenticated tip of the hash chain 
1_kr P , from which the newcomer v can verify the MAC key 1h . The source v’ continues to send 
normal data and KRPs as usual. The new comer v will catch up with the new messages by applying 
the hash function multiple times until the first verified hash key is met. Note that given the time 
stamp information in 1_kr P  and the indexes of the following hash keys, the new comer is able to 
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compute the scheduling information of the following hash keys and therefore can verify their 
legitimacy to defend against message forgery attacks. After this process, the later communications 
between v and v’ are identical to the normal protocols. 
3.5.2 The Capability to Deal with Message Loss 
Wireless communication channels are inherently lossy. Since TSVC is based on TESLA, which is 
packet-loss tolerant, our scheme is also packet-loss tolerant.  
In the case that a data packet is lost, no further action will be taken.  
On the other hand, if the KRP _ ikr P , ( 1i > ) is lost, the legitimacy of the previous message can still 
be verified upon receiving _ jkr P  with j i> . The broken hash chain can be connected by applying the 
hash function j i− times and checking if ( )j i j iH h h− = . If so, the newly arrived hash value jh is 
acceptable. However, in the case where multiple continuous packets are lost such that the time to wait 
for the new key release packet is longer than the maximum tolerable message delay, iM is neglected.  
If 1_kr P  is lost, this means the receiver does not receive the signed tip of the hash chain. This is 
similar to the case when a new comer comes into the communication range in the middle of the hash 
chain. The receiver who has lost 1_kr P  will request for another signed tip from the source.   
So in all cases, the subsequent messages can still be authenticated when new data packets and key 
release packets arrive.  In a manner similar to that discussed in 3.5.1, the receivers are able to defend 
against message forgery attacks even if some of the messages are lost.   
3.5.3 Bandwidth Efficiency 
In this section, we would like to analyze the reduction of bandwidth consumption due to the decrease 
of the average packet size compared with regular public key based schemes.  
As discussed in Section 2.3.5, ECDSA is adopted by [IEEE1609.2-2006]. The minimum additional 
space caused by the use of 224-bit ECDSA is 181 bytes for each message, including a 56-byte digital 
signature [IEEE1609.2-2006], and a 125-byte public key certificate [IEEE1609.2-2006]. Thus, the 
total length of a traditional signed packet with certificate is around 289 bytes including the message 
payload which is around 100 bytes [DoT2006], and PVID which is taken as 8 bytes in this study.  
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To evaluate the average packet size in our scheme, we assume that the KRPs are signed with the 
ECDSA scheme. Similarly, whenever a new group member is found in the communication range, the 
signed tip of the hash chain will be sent which is 219 bytes as computed below. Suppose the life time 
of an anonymous certificate is 10 minutes, routine traffic messages are sent every 300 ms, and a new 
group member will be encountered every 10 secs. The following comparisons can be made.  
For the traditional PKI based scheme, the total information that needs to be transmitted in 10 
minutes for each vehicle is: 
_P cert TotalL Num× = 289*2000= 578,000 bytes 
For the TSVC scheme, the length of a data packet is: 
8 100 2 20 130
jp PVID M index MAC
L L L L L= + + + = + + + =  bytes, 1j ≥  
where index  is taken as 2 bytes. 
The length of a KRP is 
1_
8 20 2 8 56 125 219kr P PVID h index T CertL L L L L L Lσ= + + + + + = + + + + + =  bytes 
_ 8 20 2 30jkr p PVID h indexL L L L= + + = + + =  bytes, ( 1)j >  
Therefore, the total information that needs to be transmitted in 10 minutes for each vehicle in our 
scheme is: 
1_ _ ( 1)
      
  219 60 130 2000 30 2000
  333,140 bytes
j jkr P Cert P Total kr p j Total
L Num L Num L Num>× + × + ×
= × + × + ×
=
 
which can be seen to have improved the bandwidth usage as compared to the traditional PKI based 
scheme. 
3.5.4 Combination of TSVC and GSIS 
TSVC can also be applied to the GSIS protocol with some tiny modifications. In the TSVC-enhanced 
PKI-based security scheme, the PVID  part is incorporated in the vehicle’s anonymous certificates. It 
comes into effect for several minutes and will be updated once the certificate expires. Based on this 
PVID  information, we are able to chain the messages sent by the same source together using the hash 
key chain. In the case of the GSIS protocol, since the message signed by group signature scheme does 
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not contain any identity information of the source, we need to generate a list of pseudo IDs for each 
vehicle. These pseudo IDs are also short-lived with a lifetime of several minutes. For each vehicle, 
each hash key chain corresponds to one pseudo ID and will be reinitialized whenever a new pseudo 
ID takes effect. All the other parts of the enhanced GSIS protocol remain the same with the enhanced 
PKI-based protocol except that the first key release packet is now signed and verified by the group 
signature scheme as we discussed in section 2.2.2. Therefore, by changing the length of the signature 
to 184 bytes, removing the certificate, and following the computation in section 3.5.3, the total 
information that needs to be transmitted for TSVC-enhanced GSIS in 10 minutes for each vehicle is 
333,320 bytes. This result is similar to that of the TSVC-enhanced PKI-based protocol.  
Note that the anonymity of the traditional PKI based protocol is based on short-lived anonymous 
certificates and the TSVC protocol takes advantage of this by chaining the messages sent by the same 
source together in a short period. However, by artificially adding a short-lived PVID, the 
unlinkability or the anonymity of the TSVC-enhanced GSIS protocol is weakened as compared with 
the original GSIS protocol in which no two messages can be determined to have been sent from the 
same source. However, the new GSIS protocol can still maintain the same level of anonymity as the 
PKI based security protocols and is sufficient for real-world anonymity requirements. In addition, not 
only does the TSVC-enhanced GSIS improve the system performance in terms of computation 
efficiency as will be shown in section 3.6, it also retains all the other advantages over the PKI security 
scheme such as the low overhead of the membership identity management and low storage cost for 
CRLs. 
3.6 Performance Evaluation  
Again, simulation is conducted to measure the four discussed protocols: the traditional PKI based 
scheme, the GSIS protocol, and their corresponding TSVC-enhanced protocols. We used the ns-2 
simulator with the same performance metrics and the same road scenarios as defined in section 2.4. In 
this part, we are interested in comparing the MD and MLR between the traditional PKI-based 
protocol and its TSVC enhanced version as well as between the GSIS protocol and its TSVC 
enhanced version. Some additional simulation configurations are shown in Table 3-1. The other 





Table 3-1. Some simulation configurations 
ECDSA signing delay3 2.92 ms 
ECDSA verification delay3 3.87 ms 
MAC generation & verification delay 0.5 ms 
 
Before starting the experiment, a small simulation was run to test the time that is needed to transmit 
a packet over the wireless channel in the highway scenario. Because most of the delay is incurred by 
channel contention, the longest transmission time happens when the density of the traffic is the 
highest. So in this experiment, we simulate the most crowded traffic scenario in which the 
communication range is set as 300 m, and the inter-vehicular distance is set as 5 m. Here, the time we 
considered includes the period from when the packet is ready to be put in the output buffer until it is 
received by the receiver. We extracted the simulation results of two cars, which are 300 meters away. 
From the simulation result, the average delay for all the messages sent is 6.467 ms. This simulation is 
used to decide the Key Release Delay δ  as discussed before. Therefore, the Key Release Delay δ  for 
the later experiments is conservatively set as 70 ms which is much bigger than the actual delay and 
thus ensures a high level of security.  
We then conducted two sets of experiments. The first set investigates the impact of the vehicles’ 
moving speed in a highway scenario, whereas the second set investigates the impact of vehicles’ 
density in both highway and city scenarios. 
3.6.1 Impact of Vehicle Moving Speed 
In the first set of experiments, V (the average velocity of the vehicles) is changed from 10 m/s-40 m/s 
(36 km/hr-144 km/hr). The traffic load simulated is 60 and the initial inter-vehicle distance is 30 
meters. The simulation results on the MD and MLR are shown in Figure 3-4 and Figure 3-5. In all 
four schemes, the variation of speed does not cause much influence on MD or MLR. But the 
proposed TSVC enhanced schemes yield larger MD which is slightly higher than the key release 
delay δ . However, when it comes to MLR, the two TSVC enhanced protocols reduce the message 
loss ratio compared with the original PKI and GSIS scheme under this normal traffic density. Another 
result is that the TSVC enhanced GSIS always has higher MLR and MD than the TSVC enhanced 
                                                     
3 The 224-bit ECDSA cryptographic delays are quoted from the documentation of the MIRACL cryptographic lib [SS] with a 3GHz 
Pentium IV system. These values and the values that were used to compute the timings of the group signature scheme are estimated from 
the same MIRACL lib with the same system processing power. Therefore, the values from Table 2-5 and Table 3-1 are comparable. 
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PKI scheme; this is likely due to the longer signature verification delay, even if a signature 
verification is only performed for the first message. 
  
Figure 3-4. Impact of vehicles’ moving speed on message end to end delay in highway scenario 
  
Figure 3-5. Impact of vehicles’ moving speed on message loss ratio in highway scenario 
3.6.2 Impact of Vehicle Density 
In the second set of experiments, the impact of the node density for both highway and city traffic is 
studied. We set the reference speed as 100 ± 10 km/hr for the highway scenario and the same speed 
setting for the city scenario as was given in section 2.5.   
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In Figure 3-6 and Figure 3-8, it is shown that the message end-to-end delay of TSVC enhanced 
protocols is again higher than the key-release delay and therefore is much higher than the original 
schemes. In the city scenario, however, there are unexpected higher delays when the traffic load is 
greater than 120. We believe this high delay is caused by the irregularities of the vehicles’ driving 
pattern in the city environment. Unlike in the highway where vehicles are driving on the same line, 
the vehicles in city environment may take turns all the time which in turn cause frequent changes to 
the group memberships. This indicates that more signed tips have to be sent, which therefore take a 
longer time to verify. This effect is more obvious when the traffic load is increasing. Another result is 
that delays in all situations are lower than 100 ms. This is because this 70 ms key release delay was 
informed by our simulation results. We aimed to make the overall delay lower than the maximum 
allowable latency while at the same time ensuring the security of the protocol.   
From Figure 3-7 and Figure 3-9 we can see that both the PKI and GSIS schemes suffer a huge 
message-loss ratio especially when the traffic becomes dense, which is out of the allowable range; 
however, both TSVC enhanced schemes maintain a stable and very low message-loss ratio which is 
from 0.7% to 4 %. They are found to be much less sensitive to the traffic load. 
  




Figure 3-7. Impact of the traffic load on the message loss ratio in city scenario 
 
Figure 3-8. Impact of the traffic load on the message end to end delay in highway scenario 




Figure 3-9. Impact of the traffic load on the message loss ratio in highway scenario 
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Chapter 4 Conclusion 
This study first presents a new security mechanism called GSIS based on group signature and ID-
based signature schemes for IVC applications. With group signatures, security, privacy, and efficient 
traceability can be achieved without inducing the overhead to manage a huge number of stored 
certificates. Meanwhile, public key and certificate management operations are further avoided for the 
communications between the RSU and OBU by using an ID-based signature technique to sign the 
messages sent by RSUs. Upon simulation, however, the observed message delays and loss ratios are 
not desirable in most traffic load scenarios. Better performance can be achieved in less dense traffic 
load conditions with powerful processors. We expect much better performance when the group 
signature verification is implemented in hardware. To enhance the performance of GSIS with 
software implementation, the study further proposes a novel TSVC security protocol. The new TSVC 
protocol can be applied to both GSIS and traditional PKI based security mechanisms. It significantly 
improves the system efficiency in terms of the packet length and the computation complexity without 
affecting the security and conditional anonymity requirements in VANETs. TSVC-enhanced 
protocols are measured through extensive simulations, which demonstrate that they incur a much 
lower message loss ratio compared to that of traditional public key based security schemes as well as 
the GSIS scheme, especially when the density of vehicles increases.  
On the other hand, there are some shortcomings for our scheme as well. For example, the message 
end-to-end delay in TSVC-enhanced GSIS is increased by introducing a key release delay. Since the 
delay is still within the maximum allowable message latency, it is still acceptable. In addition, to 
maintain a comparatively stable group relationship, TSVC-enhanced GSIS cannot verify routine 
messages from the opposite side of the road. However, considering that routine messages in the same 
driving direction are much more useful, it is reasonable to make such a decision. One other concern 
for our scheme is that there are some centralized trusted authorities like MM who knows everybody's 
private key, and like TM who can reveal the identities of vehicles. This is a single point of failure. To 
overcome this weakness, cryptographic threshold technologies [BZ2004, DCL2004] can be used in 
real life to share secret keys and thus diminish the rights held by a single party.  
Based on the above considerations, the TSVC-enhanced security protocols can serve as good 
candidates for real-world vehicular communication applications. 
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As for future research, how to improve the efficiency of the CRL checking procedure will be an 
interesting project. In our scheme, even if the hybrid revocation scheme of section 2.2.2.6 is used, the 
CRL checking procedure still incurs a high computational cost. Therefore, migrating these operations 
to the RSU side, which will instead perform the CRL checking process and broadcast the result to the 
vehicles in its communication range will be an interesting topic to examine. In addition, how to 
modify the TSVC-enhanced GSIS protocol so that it can achieve efficiency without affecting the 
‘unlinkability’ property of the group signature scheme is a potential way to get improvements.  In this 
paper, we authenticate the nodes in order to build the trust relationship which can not detect the node 
sending valid but fake messages. Therefore, how to detect valid but fake messages will be a 
challenging work as well. Another interesting topic is how to prevent movement tracking attack 
conducted by observing message contents and thus linking two consecutive messages from the same 
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